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Abstract
The growing availability of personal genomics services comes with increasing concerns for genomic privacy.
Individuals may wish to withhold sensitive genotypes that contain critical health-related information when sharing
their data with such services. A straightforward solution that masks only the sensitive genotypes does not ensure
privacy due to the correlation structure within the genome. Here, we develop an information-theoretic mechanism
for masking sensitive genotypes, which ensures no information about the sensitive genotypes is leaked. We also
propose an efficient algorithmic implementation of our mechanism for genomic data governed by hidden Markov
models. Our work is a step towards more rigorous control of privacy in genomic data sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The rise of personal genomics, whereby private individuals are exposed to an increasing range of
services for sequencing, sharing, or analyzing their genomes, is leading to growing concerns for genomic
privacy [1]–[3]. A personal genome is a rich trove of information about the underlying individual, including
predictors for disease risks and other health-related traits, which holds great potential for improving
one’s health, yet may cause harm if used against the individual. Unlike other types of personal data
like passwords, one’s genetic data cannot be replaced once leaked, and a data breach may even affect
the relatives of the individual whose genome is leaked. In order to facilitate the sharing of genomes to
improve public health and advance science, we need principled strategies for controlling the privacy risks
associated with genomic data sharing.
A key need in this regard is to selectively limit the leakage of information about biological or health-
related traits of an individual that can be inferred from the shared genetic data. For example, one may wish
to hide certain genotypes (an individual’s genetic information at specific genomic positions) with well-
established disease association before sharing his or her data with others (e.g., analytic service providers
or researchers). Such a capability would allow individuals to have fine-grained control over their genomic
privacy.
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2Notably, a simple approach to privacy protection, whereby sensitive positions in the genome are masked
before sharing the data, does not provide sufficient privacy protection. This is because the correlation
structure among different genomic positions can be used to reconstruct the masked data as demonstrated
in a number of studies [4], [5].
To prevent such an attack, one could alternatively erase all positions that are highly correlated with
the sensitive sites [6], which may be achieved by masking the data within a large window around each
sensitive position. Unfortunately, these approaches either provide incomplete privacy protection or require
an excessive amount of data to be erased in order to achieve strong privacy, thus limiting the usefulness
of the shared data. Here, we aim to design an effective mechanism for sharing a personal genome that
provably hides sensitive positions, while introducing a small amount of erasure.
B. Genetics Background
An individuals genome consists of a pair of sequences, one from each parent, each consisting of around 3
billion nucleotides (A, C, G, and T). Each sequence is referred to as a haplotype. Since most of the genome
is identical between different individuals, a common way to compactly represent a personal genome is
as a list of positions of variation, paired with the observed nucleotides in the given individual (referred
to as a genotype). In this work, we consider the problem of sharing a list of genotypes corresponding
to a single haplotype of an individual. Although standard sequencing pipelines produce a genotype at
each position that mixes the two haplotypes, well-established methods exist for resolving this ambiguity
in order to separate the two haplotypes (a process called phasing), after which our approach could be
individually applied to each haplotype.
In our attack scenario, the goal of an adversary is to infer the target individuals genotypes at specific
positions in the genome, given a partially masked genetic sequence of the individual released by our
mechanism. In principle, this reconstruction task is equivalent to an extensively studied problem in
bioinformatics known as genotype imputation, originally developed for coping with missing data in
sequencing experiments, which often cover only a subset of genomic positions. If one were to mask
only the sensitive positions before sharing the data, existing imputation algorithms are expected to be
effective at revealing the hidden genotypes using other genotypes in their respective neighborhoods.
A state-of-the-art algorithm for genotype imputation, minimac [7], is based on a classical model of
genetic sequences introduced by Li and Stephens [8]. In this model, a persons genetic sequence is
modelled as a mosaic of a large group of reference sequences from other individuals. This model intuitively
captures the underlying biological process of recombination, which describes the interleaving of two
haplotypes of each parent when their genetic material is passed onto the child. Formally, these models
3are expressed as hidden Markov models (HMMs), where a sequence of genotypes of an individual is
generated from a sequence of hidden states, representing which reference sequence to copy the genotype
for each corresponding position. We adopt this model in our work to capture the underlying distribution
of genotypes. Alternative approaches to imputation (e.g. based on matrix factorization [9]) exist. We
take the HMM-based approach since it is widely used in genetics for tasks beyond imputation, including
phasing [10] and simulation [11]. Further details of this model is provided in Section II.
C. Setup and Contributions
In this work, we consider the problem of hiding sensitive genotypes when sharing genomic data. The
genotype sequence X of length n is generated by a hidden Markov model as previously described. The
user wants to share his or her genotype sequence for genomic services, while keeping private sensitive
genotypes in given locations in the sequence. Thus, the problem is to keep the sensitive positions private
while introducing minimum number of erasures in the released version of the genotype sequence X.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold:
1) For any given underlying distribution pX, we develop an information-theoretic privacy mechanism to
hide the sensitive positions. This builds on prior work on ON-OFF privacy [12], [13] and generalize
it to general distributions.
2) For the data generative model, i.e., hidden Markov model, considered in this paper, we propose an
efficient algorithm to implement the privacy mechanism.
II. REVIEW OF HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL FOR GENOMES
The classical hidden Markov model (HMM) describing the distribution of personal genomes [8] is as
follows. First, let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) represent an individual’s (haplotype) genetic sequence of length
n. Following standard practice in genetics, we adopt a binary alphabet A = {0, 1} for each element
Xi, representing whether the observed nucleotide is identical to the one in the reference human genome
(called reference allele) or not (alternative allele).
In addition, we are given a reference dataset of m personal genome sequencesH = {hj : j = 1, . . . ,m},
where each sequence hj is of length n. The i-th coordinate of hj is denoted by hi,j , which also takes a
value in A.
In this model, X is viewed as a “mosaic” of reference sequences in H with potential substitution
errors arising from mutations or experimental noise in sequencing. Formally, X depends on a sequence of
hidden states {Si}ni=1 forming a Markov chain, where each Si takes an integer in the range {1, . . . ,m},
representing an index into H. Without loss of generality, we assume that the initial state S1 is uniformly
4distributed over {1, . . . ,m}. The transition probability pii,j from state i to j is assumed to be 1m and 1− 
for i 6= j and i = j respectively.
Next, each Xi is sampled based on the hidden state Si by copying the corresponding symbol in the
selected reference sequence with a small probability of error. In other words, Xi is equal to the symbol
in the i-th position of hSi with probability of error θ. The overall data distribution pX is fully specified
by the tuple (H, , θ). We provide a graphical illustration of pX in Fig. 1.
In our work, we assume that the parameters of the above model are known. In practice, we expect
these parameters to be estimated from a large collection of reference genomes, e.g., including hundreds of
thousands of individuals, which are currently available in public data repositories (e.g., UK Biobank [14]).
It is worth noting that HMM parameters could be more accurately estimated by using a larger set of
reference dataset. However, given the high cost of amassing large-scale genomic data, it would be a
significant challenge for an attacker to gain access to a larger dataset than those in the public realm,
so our modeling assumption could be thought of as providing privacy protection according to the best
knowledge of the field.
h1
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...
hm
Reference
States
S1 S2 S3 · · · Sn
BSCθ
X
REF allele
ALT allele
Fig. 1: A graphical illustration of HMM for genomes. The state space of the hidden states is {1, . . . ,m},
where each element corresponds to an index into the reference dataset {h1, . . . ,hm} (each of length n).
A Markov process {Si}ni=1 indicates which reference sequence the user reads the data from at the i-th
position. For each i, Xi differs from the i-th position of hSi with probability θ, representing noise in the
data. BSCθ: Binary symmetric channel with crossover probability θ. REF: Reference. ALT: Alternative.
5III. THE GENOTYPE-HIDING PROBLEM
Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be the user’s personal genome sequence of length n, which is generated by the
hidden Markov model described in Section II. In this section, we assume the knowledge of underlying
distribution pX, i.e., the personal genome sequence generated by the hidden Markov model (H, , θ), is
given. It means that the formulation of the privacy problem is for any given pX instead of any particular
data generative model such as HMMs.
The user wishes to share X with others, but is concerned about the information revealed by certain
coordinates of X. To hide the data at these sensitive coordinates, the user generates a masked version
of the data Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), which only partially reveals X. Since we expect substitution errors to be
considerably more undesirable than erasures in genetic analyses, we impose a constraint that Yi can be
either Xi or the erasure symbol ∗; we refer to this property as the faithfulness condition. Note that the
alphabet of Yi is A ∪ {∗}.
Let K ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the user-provided set of indices of X containing sensitive information. We
require that no information about XK = {Xi : i ∈ K} is revealed when Y is shared. In other words, we
require that
I(XK;Y) = 0, (1)
which we refer to as the privacy condition. This guarantees that XK and Y are statistically independent,
which is stronger than alternative notions of privacy such as local differential privacy [15].
Our goal is to design a privacy mechanism pY|X for generating Y given X and K such that both
the faithfulness and privacy conditions are satisfied. While doing so, we wish to share as much of X as
possible. Let e(Y) be the number of erasure symbols in Y. Our goal is to minimize the expected number
of erasures E[e(Y)], where
E[e(Y)] =
n∑
i=1
E[1yi=∗] =
n∑
i=1
p(yi = ∗), (2)
and 1{·} denotes the indicator function. In other words, we are interested in solving the following problem:
minimize
pY|X
1
n
n∑
i=1
p(yi = ∗)
subject to I(XK;Y) = 0 (Privacy)
Yi ∈ {Xi, ∗},∀i (Faithfulness)
(3)
Although the above problem is an instance of linear programming (LP), the scale of the problem is
intractable, given the exponential blowup in the number of variables and constraints as the length of the
sequence n grows. Therefore, we are interested in an analytical characterization of solutions pY|X to the
above problem.
6IV. PRIVACY MECHANISM
In this section, we present a privacy mechanism to generate Y such that both the faithfulness and privacy
conditions are satisfied for any general distribution pX. Later in Section V, we will focus on pX defined
by a hidden Markov model and propose an efficient algorithm to implement the privacy mechanism.
As defined, Yi can either be Xi (i.e., no erasure) or ∗ (i.e., erasure), so the problem is to design a
proper erasure rate for each coordinate i. Our proposed scheme generates Y in a sequential manner: Let
(o1, . . . , on) be any permutation of (1, . . . , n). We generate Y in the order of (o1, . . . , on), where each Yoi
may depend on the preceding variables Yo1 , . . . , Yoi−1 .
Privacy mechanism: Given an order (o1, . . . , on), generate each Yoi according to the following condi-
tional distribution
p
(
yoi |xoi , xK, yo1 , . . . , yoi−1
)
=

min
u∈A|K| p(xoi |xK=u,yo1 ,...,yoi−1)
p(xoi |xK,yo1 ,...,yoi−1)
, yoi = xoi ,
1− minu∈A|K| p(xoi |xK=u,yo1 ,...,yoi−1)
p(xi|xK,yo1 ,...,yoi−1)
, yoi = ∗,
(4)
for any xoi , xK and yo1 , . . . , yoi−1 .
Remark. One may notice that we do not specify a particular order here, which means that the mechanism
can be used for any given order. However, the choice of the order may affect the performance, i.e., expected
number of erasures, of the mechanism. Finding the best order for the sequential mechanism, given K and
pX, remains an open problem.
Theorem 1. The privacy mechanism given in (4) satisfies the privacy and faithfulness conditions.
Note that our privacy mechanism satisfies the faithfulness condition by design. Before verifying the
privacy condition, we note the following properties of the privacy mechanism.
1) If oi ∈ K, then
min
u∈A|K|
p
(
xoi |xK = u, yo1 , . . . , yoi−1
)
= 0,
which yields
p
(
yoi = ∗|xoi , xK, yo1 , . . . , yoi−1
)
= 1.
This implies that the user needs to always erase Yoi , if Xoi is sensitive.
2) We notice from (4) that xoi is not erased with some nonzero probability, so this mechanism is strictly
better than the naı¨ve approach of always erasing the positions that may leak sensitive information.
A. Interpretation of the privacy mechanism
Here, we provide some intuition behind the proposed privacy mechanism in (4). Given an order
(o1, . . . , on) of the sequential mechanism, consider a greedy algorithm for solving the problem in (3),
7which locally minimizes the erasure probability p (yoi = ∗), one coordinate at a time. That is, for each
i = 1, . . . , n, we solve
min
pYoi |X,Yo[i−1]
p (yoi = ∗)
s.t. I(XK;Yoi |Yo[i−1]) = 0
Yoi ∈ {Xoi , ∗}
(5)
where o[i−1] := {o1, . . . , oi−1}. Note that
I(XK;Y) =
n∑
i=1
I(XK;Yoi |Yo[i−1]) = 0, (6)
by the chain rule if the first constraint of (5) is satisfied for all i.
It turns out that the privacy mechanism given in (4) is the optimal solution to (5). To see this, for any
given yo[i−1] , consider
p
(
yoi = ∗|yo[i−1]
)
= 1−
∑
yoi∈A
p
(
yoi |yo[i−1]
)
(a)
=1−
∑
yoi∈A
min
xK
p
(
yoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
(b)
=1−
∑
yoi∈A
min
xK
p
(
yoi = xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
= 1−
∑
xoi∈A
min
xK
p
(
xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
p
(
yoi = xoi |xoi , xK, yo[i−1]
)
(c)≥ 1−
∑
xoi∈A
min
xK
p
(
xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
,
where (a) follows from the privacy condition, (b) follows from the faithful condition, and (c) follows
because probabilities are bounded by 1.
One may check that the above equality holds by letting
p
(
yoi = xoi |xoi , xK, yo[i−1]
)
=
minu∈A|K| p
(
xoi |xK = u, yo[i−1]
)
p
(
xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
) . (7)
It implies that we attain the minimal probability of erasing yoi by choosing (7), which is exactly our
mechanism given in (4).
In other words, if we adopt our sequential mechanism with the ordering (o1, . . . , on), then the privacy
mechanism as given in (4) can be viewed as an optimal greedy optimization algorithm for the given order.
8B. Proof of privacy
To show the proposed mechanism in (4) satisfies the privacy condition, we know from (6) that it is
sufficient to show that
I(Yoi ;XK|Yo1 , . . . , Yoi−1) = 0, (8)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
To establish (8), we will prove that
p
(
yoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
= p
(
yoi|yo[i−1]
)
(9)
for any xK and yo[i−1] . Since
p
(
yoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
=
∑
xoi
p
(
xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
p
(
yoi |xoi , xK, yo[i−1]
)
, (10)
by substituting (4), we have
p
(
yoi = ∗|xK, yo[i−1]
)
=
∑
xoi
p
(
xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
p
(
yoi = ∗|xoi , xK, yo[i−1]
)
= 1−
∑
xoi
min
u∈A|K|
p
(
xoi |xK = u, yo[i−1]
)
. (11)
Similarly, for yi ∈ A, we have
p
(
yoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
=
∑
xoi
p
(
xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
p
(
yoi = xoi |xoi , xK, yo[i−1]
)
=
∑
xoi
min
u∈A|K|
p
(
xoi |xK = u, yo[i−1]
)
. (12)
By combining (11) and (12), we observe that
p
(
yoi |xK, yo1 , . . . , yoi−1
)
= p
(
yoi |yo1 , . . . , yoi−1
)
,
for any xK and yo1 , . . . , yoi , which finishes the proof of (8).
V. AN EFFICIENT ALGORITHM FOR HMMS
In this section, we propose an efficient algorithm to implement the privacy mechanism introduced in
Section IV for pX based on a hidden Markov model (H, , θ).
As seen in (4), the privacy mechanism determines the probability of erasing Xoi mainly based on
the probability p
(
xoi |xK, yo[i−1]
)
. By employing a belief propagation approach akin to the well-known
forward-backward algorithm [16], we develop an efficient algorithm to track the computation of
p
(
xoi |xK = u, yo[i−1]
)
9for all u ∈ A|K|. The novelty of our algorithm is that it incorporates the stochasticity of the privacy mech-
anism in addition to that of the HMM. In the following, we set the order (o1, o2, . . . , on) to (1, 2, . . . , n);
such a linear order enables our algorithm to be computationally efficient.
First, note that it is sufficient to describe how to compute p
(
xi|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
for all u ∈ A|K| and
i ∈ [n], which fully determines the distribution of y1, . . . , yn specified by our privacy mechanism, i.e.,
p
(
yi|xi, xK = u, y[i−1]
)
=

1− minu p(xi|xK=u,y[i−1])
p(xi|xK,y[i−1])
, yi = ∗,
minu p(xi|xK=u,y[i−1])
p(xi|xK,y[i−1])
, yi = xi,
(13)
where [i] := {1, . . . , i}.
We begin by expressing p
(
xi|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
as
p
(
xi|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
=
∑
si
p
(
si|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
p
(
xi|si, xK = u, y[i−1]
)
=
∑
si
∑
si−1
p
(
si−1|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
p (si|si−1, xK = u) p (xi|si) . (14)
It is observed that
p (si|si−1, xK = u) = p (si, si−1, xK = u)
p (si−1, xK = u)
=
p
(
si−1|xKi− = u−
)
p (si|si−1) p
(
xKi+ = u+|si
)
p
(
si−1|xKi− = u−
)
p
(
xKi+ = u+|si−1
)
=
p (si|si−1) p
(
xKi+ = u+|si
)
p
(
xKi+ = u+|si−1
)
=
p (si|si−1) p
(
xKi+ = u+|si
)∑
si
p (si|si−1) p
(
xKi+ = u+|si
) , (15)
where Ki− := K ∩ {1, . . . , i − 1}, Ki+ := K ∩ {i, . . . , n}, u− and u+ are corresponding values of xKi−
and xKi+ specified by u.
As p (xi|si) and p (si|si−1) are directly given by the HMM, we need to compute two terms, i.e.,
p
(
si−1|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
and p
(
xKi+ = u+|si
)
. To simplify our notation, we introduce the following vari-
ables to represent the terms p
(
si−1|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
and p
(
xKi+ = u+|si
)
:
ψ(i)(u, si) = p (si|xK = u, y1, . . . , yi) , (16)
and
γ(i)(u, si) = p
(
xKi+ = u+|si
)
. (17)
Note that if we have ψ(i)(u, si) and γ(i)(u, si) for a given position i, then we can calculate (14) as
p
(
xi|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
=
∑
si−1
∑
si
ψ(i−1)(u, si−1)p (si|si−1) γ(i)(u, si)p (xi|si)∑
si
p (si|si−1) γ(i)(u, si) . (18)
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First, note that γ(i)(u, si) can be done in the same manner as calculating the backward probabilities in
the forward-backward algorithm. Details are as follows:
Initialization: We initialize γ(n)(u, sn) by
γ(n)(u, sn) =
p (xn = un|sn) , n ∈ K,1, n /∈ K. (19)
Iterations: For i = n− 1, . . . , 1, we compute γ(i)(u, si) as
γ(i)(u, si) =

∑
si+1
p (xi = ui|si) p (si+1|si) γ(i+1)(u, si+1), i ∈ K∑
si+1
p (si+1|si) γ(i+1)(u, si+1), i /∈ K.
(20)
Second, to efficiently compute ψ(i)(u, si) for i ∈ [n], we adopt the following iterative steps.
Initialization: ψ(1)(u, s1) is initialized by
ψ(1)(u, s1) ∝ p (s1|xK = u) p (y1|s1, xK = u) , (21)
where p (s1|xK = u) can be calculated by (15) given γ(1)(u, s1), and p (y1|s1, xK = u) is given by our
mechanism as shown in (13).
Iterations: Using Bayes’ rule, we can express ψ(i)(u, si) as
ψ(i)(u, si) = p
(
si|xK = u, y[i]
) ∝ p (si|xK = u, y[i−1]) p (yi|si, xK = u, y[i−1]) , (22)
where
p
(
si|xK = u, y[i−1]
)
=
∑
si−1
ψ(i−1)(u, si−1)p (si|si−1, xK = u) ,
p
(
yi|si, xK = u, y[i−1]
)
=
∑
xi
p (xi|si) p
(
yi|xi, xK = u, y[i−1]
)
.
Therefore, ψ(i)(u) can be computed given ψ(i−1)(u). Note that the term p (si|si−1, xK = u) can be cal-
culated provided γ(i)(u, si) as shown in (15), and p(yi|xi, xK = u, y[i−1]) is given by our mechanism as
shown in (13). Using this recurrence relation, ψ(i)(u, si) for all i ∈ [n] can be computed.
Analogous to the forward-backward algorithm, our algorithm has polynomial computational complexity
of O(nm2) for a fixed u, with respect to the sequence length n and the number of reference sequences m,
for a given u. Clearly, minu∈A|K| p
(
xoi |xK = u, yo[i−1]
)
can be easily obtained once p
(
xi|xK = u, yo[i−1]
)
for all u have been computed. This overhead involves a factor of 2|K| in the computational complexity,
but we expect |K| to be a small constant in practice (e.g., less than 10); since genotype correlation is
predominantly local, the user may apply our mechanism to local regions of the genome of a permissive
length, each of which including only a few sensitive positions.
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Algorithm 1 Mechanism for hiding sensitive genotypes in x
Input: Genome sequence X = (X1, . . . , Xn) from an HMM with parameters (H, , θ), and indices of
sensitive positions K ⊂ [n]
Output: Masked genome sequence Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), s.t. I(XK;Y) = 0 and yi ∈ {xi, ∗} for all i ∈ [n]
1: Initialize γ(n)(u, sn) according to (19)
2: for i = n− 1, . . . , 1 do
3: for u ∈ A|K| do
4: Compute γ(i)(u, si) according to (20)
5: Compute p (si|si−1, xK = u) according to (15)
6: end for
7: end for
8: Initialize ψ(1)(u, s1) according to (19)
9: for i = 2, . . . , n do
10: Calculate the erasure probability for yi using (13)
11: Generate yi ∈ {xi, ∗} according to the erasure probability
12: for u ∈ A|K| do
13: Compute ψ(i)(u, si) according to (22)
14: end for
15: end for
VI. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF OPTIMALITY
As we described in Section IV-A, our mechanism can be viewed as a greedy algorithm for minimizing
the number of erasures of a mechanism that perfectly hides the sensitive genotypes. However, the optimality
of the greedy algorithm remains incompletely understood.
As discussed previously, it may depend on the order of generating positions. Furthermore, a sequential
mechanism may not be optimal in general, that is to say, generating multiple positions jointly (in contrast
to a sequential mechanism that generates one position at a time) may lead to a better solution.
Nevertheless, one can show that an upper bound on the (non-erasure) rate of any feasible solution to
this genotype hiding problem (3) is given by
1
n
n∑
i=1
p (yi 6= ∗) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
xi∈A
min
u∈A|K|
p (xi|xK = u) . (23)
To establish (23), it is sufficient to show
p (yi 6= ∗) ≤
∑
xi∈A
min
u∈AK
p (xi|xK = u) (24)
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for any mechanism satisfying the privacy and faithful conditions. Towards this end, consider
p (yi 6= ∗) =
∑
yi∈A
p (yi)
(a)
=
∑
yi∈A
min
u
p (yi|xK = u)
(b)
=
∑
yi∈A
min
u
p (yi = xi|xK = u)
=
∑
xi∈A
min
u
p (xi|xK = u) p (yi = xi|xi, xK = u)
≤
∑
xi∈A
min
u
p (xi|xK = u) ,
where (a) follows because I(XK;Y) = 0 implies that Yi is independent of XK, which means that p (yi) =
p (yi|xK = u) for all u, so that p (yi) = minu p (yi|xK = u); (b) follows from Yi ∈ {Xi, ∗}.
In addition, our proposed mechanism attains this upper bound for X that forms a Markov chain (not
HMM) with a single sensitive position. Interestingly, our preliminary simulation study for the HMM case,
shown in Fig. 2, suggests that the performance of our mechanism is sometimes very close to the upper
bound, while in certain settings, the gap between the our mechanism and the upper bound is considerably
large. Closing the gap between the mechanism and the upper bound is our ongoing work.
Fig. 2: Comparison of our mechanism and the upper bound on simulated HMM data, with m = 10,
n = 100, θ = 0.01, K = {1}. Transition probability  refers to the probability of leaving the current state
in each step of the HMM, where the next state is chosen uniformly at random.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed an information-theoretically private mechanism to hide sensitive genotypes,
and proposed an efficient algorithmic implementation of this mechanism for hidden Markov models.
There are several key directions for future work. First, although we focused on achieving information-
theoretic privacy, it may be useful in practice to consider a relaxed notion such as differential privacy [17].
This may give the user the ability to determine the desired tradeoff between the level of privacy and the
amount of data to be erased. Second, our work could be further integrated with existing strategies for
mitigating re-identification risk by embedding the genome in a larger collection of genomes [18]. Lastly, it
would be interesting to explore the generalization of our mechanism to a broader class of data generative
models, which may allow similar mechanisms to be developed for protecting sensitive data in other
domains.
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